



# Towards Implicit Visual Memory-Based Authentication

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# Types of Authentication


Competing requirements of **security** and **usability**. [1]

## Common Factors:

- 1) **Knowledge (Password, PIN)**
- 2) Biometrics (Fingerprint, Face)
- 3) Possession (Token)

## Reinforced by:

- 2-Factor Authentication
- Risk-based Authentication
- Continuous Authentication



# Knowledge-based Authentication

## Example: Passwords


- 1) Create a secure password
- 2) **Remember the password**
- 3) Provide at time of authentication

All steps involved are hard for users.

→ High cognitive burden

→ Password reuse

→ Password resets




# Fallback Authentication

Used to regain access if the primary means of authentication is lost!


## Different:

- Memorability
  - Rate limiting
  - Time required to authenticate
- Often the weakest link in the chain  
(Sarah Palin, Mat Honan, ...)
- We need to design better systems!



The image shows a screenshot of a Google account security question interface. At the top, there is a dropdown menu labeled "Security Question 1". Below it, a list of six questions is displayed, with the second question, "What was the name of your first pet?", highlighted in blue. Below the list is an input field labeled "answer". Further down, there is another dropdown menu labeled "Security Question 3" and another "answer" input field. At the bottom of the form, there is a text block that reads: "These security questions will help us verify your identity when you need to access your account or reset your password." Below this text are two buttons: "Cancel" and "Continue". In the bottom right corner of the image, there is a small text "[2]".

# Let's Play



Before we start, a short game.

# Priming



# Priming



## Bells





# Priming

## Bells



# Priming

## Bells



# Priming



# Priming





## Cows



# Priming

## Cows



# Mooney Images

Thresholded two-tone images showing a single object.

## Recognition:

- Hard to recognize at first sight
- Sudden recognition (aha! / Eureka-effect)
- Intrinsically / By marking the contour of object / Showing the original image



## Value for Authentication?

- Trigger brain processes involved in **implicit memory**.




# Implicit Memory

*Unintentional recollection* of information.

Can be observed in *habitual* behavior, i.e., riding a bike, playing an instrument.

We are not aware of the information stored in our memory.

We can trigger the implicit memory by a process called *priming*.





Ludmer et al. Neuron 2011 [3]

# MooneyAuth

Relieves users of the cognitive burden of remembering an explicit password.


## 1) Enrollment / Priming:

- Prime on set of random Mooney images.
- We show every image twice.




## 2) Authentication:

- Primed + non-primed Mooney images are presented to the user.
- User is requested to label the images.
- Scoring algorithm based on surprisal of observed events.
- User authenticated: score > threshold.



# Enrollment / Priming

- Smooth transition
- Takes 3.5 seconds per image.
- In a user study we primed 10 images



# Authentication

Primed + non-primed images are presented.

## Task:

User has to **label** the image

or

skip by pressing the **I don't know** button.


## Assumption:

User labels primed images more often correctly (and faster).

[MooneyAuth](#) [About](#) [Contact](#)  [Logout](#)

## Authentication

Image 1 of 20



Please enter the tag for the mooney image shown above:

# Scoring

- Score derived from the self-information (surprisal) of the observed events.
- There are four events that can occur:

	Correct Label	Incorrect Label
Primed	$p_i$	$1-p_i$
Non-Primed	$n_i$	$1-n_i$

$$I(E_{primed,correct}) = -\log_2 P(correct \mid primed)$$

→ A “good” Mooney image has a **high  $p_i$** , but **low  $n_i$**  value.

# Attacker Model

The security does not rely on secrecy of the hidden object.

We provide the attacker with the solution for every Mooney image:

- Mooney image
- Original grayscale image
- Correct label

The scheme can not be broken by computer vision algorithms!




# Attacker Model

**Secret:** Knowing which images the user was primed on.

During enrollment images are selected by the server:

- No user selection bias
- Random guessing
- Rate limit guessing attempts



# Main Results

Does implicit memory-based authentication work?



# User Studies

## Pre Study

230 participants  
20 days

### Goals:

- Get  $p_i$ ,  $n_i$  for Scoring
- Test Label Matching

## Long-Term Study

~130 participants  
8.5 months

### Goals:

- Long-Term Effects


## Main Study

70 participants  
21 days



### Goals:

- Performance Measure

# Previous Work




# Our Result




# Long-Term Results

How long does the priming last?


# Priming Effect Decline Over Time:



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


# Benefits and Limitations

## Benefits:

- High memorability
- Server selected secret (no user bias)


## Limitations:

- Cumbersome to label (software keyboard, time required)
- Unexplored: Interference effects (use for multiple services)
- Phishing
- Shoulder surfing
- Secure storage of secret





# Let's Play Again!



Back to the game.

# Authentication

?



# Authentication



# Authentication

## Cows



# Authentication

?



# Authentication



# Authentication


## Elephant




# Takeaway



Mooney Images



Implicit Memory



Implicit Memory-Based Authentication

Demo? [mooneyauth.org](http://mooneyauth.org)





# Mooney Image Generation

- 1) Image search with nouns from “MRC Psycholinguistic Database”.
- 1) Convert images to gray-scale.
- 2) Smoothing via Gaussian filter.
- 3) Apply Otsu’s histogram based thresholding algorithm.
- 4) Filter for mean recognition rate of 5 sec. and longer. [5]

