


# On the Accuracy of Password Strength Meters


Maximilian Golla and Markus Dürmuth

Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security Ruhr University Bochum










# **Password Strength Meter**


Nudge users toward more secure passwords




# **Meter Implementations**


#### **Strength Value:**

- Text [Weak, Medium, Strong]
- Color (Red, Orange, Green)
- Percentages (42%)
- Values/Scores (67)
- Time (12 days)
- "Bits" (82 bits)
- Guesses (1,018,291)




- Client-/server-side
- Heuristics
- Probabilistic models






#### How secure is acmccs18?



## **Outline**



### We need a Reference


## Reference

Strength	Password
1	123456
2	password 🌡
3	123456789
9	12345678
19	qwerty 🚪
(S)	cookie 🌡
154	7777777
*	

# **Strength Meter**


Strength	Password
7	123456
3	password
1	123456789
2	12345678
82	qwerty
1300	cookie
430	7777777

# 1) Compare Strength Values




	Compa	rison
	Strength	Strength
	Reference	Meter
123456	1	7
password	2	3
123456789	3	1
12345678	9	2
qwerty	19	82
cookie	63	1309
777777	154	430
	•••	•••
00miner0	2.18E+8	1.12E+11
0031alice0031	1.69E+14	2.94E+15

# 2) Count Over- and Underestimates




	Compa	rison
	Strength	Strength
	Reference	Meter
123456	1	7
password	2	3
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12345678	9	2
qwerty	19	82
cookie	63	1309
777777	154	430
•••		
00miner0	2.18E+8	1.12E+11
0031alice0031	1.69E+14	2.94E+15

# 3) Compare Ranking




	Comparison	
	Ranking	Ranking
	Reference	Meter
123456	1.	4.
password	2.	3.
123456789	3.	1.
12345678	4.	2.
qwerty	5.	5.
cookie	6.	7.
777777	7.	6.
	•••	•••
00miner0	9999.	9999.
0031alice0031	10000.	10000.

# 4) Compare Weighted Ranking



		Comparison	
	Weight	Ranking	Ranking
	Count	Reference	Meter
123456	1044164	1.	4.
password	176120	2.	3.
123456789	136179	3.	1.
12345678	48229	4.	2.
qwerty	19554	5.	5.
cookie	15423	6.	7.
777777	88076	7.	6.
•••			
00miner0	1	9999.	9999.
031alice0031	1	10000.	10000.

## **Outline**



# **Our Approach**

**Goal**: Identify the most appropriate metric to measure the accuracy of strength meters


Create a Reference Simulate strength meters Compare similarity metrics

#### **Create a Reference**




Strength: Frequency

## **Create a Reference**




# **Create a Reference**

REF-A vs. REF-B		
Reference	Meter	
(Count)	(Count)	
63	64	
19	19	
9	7	
3	3	
2	2	
1	1	
•••		




# **Simulate Strength Meters**



# **Simulate Strength Meters (Example)**

REF-A vs.	Q4-equi
Reference	Meter
(Count)	(Bin)
63	40
19	30
9	20
3	20
2	10
1	10
•••	



# **Compare Similarity Metrics**



#### **Correlation**

- Pearson Correlation
- Spearman Rank Correlation
- Kendall Rank Correlation



#### **Mean Error Metrics**

- Mean Absolute Error
- Mean Square Error



### **Weighted variants**



#### **One-Sided/Pairwise Error Metrics**

- Mean Abs./Squared One-Sided Lower Error
- Pairwise Error/Utility Rate





## Recommendation

- weighted and ranked metrics (e.g., weighted Spearman correlation)

## **Evaluated Datasets**

PW List	Year	Service
RockYou	2009	Social Games
LinkedIn	2012	Social Network
000Webhost	2016	Web Hosting

### Why multiple datasets?

- Service-specific passwords
- "Important" vs. "Don't care" accounts
- Composition Policies
- Tuned meters

#### **Evaluation**

# Use Case 1: Online Attacker

Sample: Rand. 1k from top 10k

**Strength**: Count value

# Use Case 2: Offline Attacker


Sample: Random 10k

Strength: PGS min auto [1]


#### **Querying the Meters:**

Selenium (Appium)
Contacting the developers
Train/Patch/Reimplement





# **Large Scale Comparison**




A METER COMPARISON

In the following, we list the full results of our data collection. We separated the five categories Academic Poparalis, Password Maxager.

Operating Systems, Websiter, and Previous Work into two tables. A colorful version that allows cosier comparison can be found online [29]

## **Outline**



# **Accuracy**

Markov	

#### Markov Model

NDSS '12 [13]

0.721 - 0.998



#### Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar

ACSAC '12 [34]

DSN '16 [65]

0.963 - 1.000



#### **Recurrent Neural Network**

USENIX '16 [46]

CHI '17 [59]

0.913 - 0.965



#### **Advanced Heuristic**

USENIX '16 [71]

0.554 - 0.990

1.0 High positive correlation

0.0 No correlation


-1.0 High negative correlation

# **Accuracy**

Password Managers (0.284—0.962): KeePass, Keeper, zxcvbn-based

**Operating Systems** (-0.849—0.469):





## **Effect of Quantization**

It's important to carefully choose the quantization thresholds.



- Bad thresholds:

**Abs.:** 0.393—0.884 **Quant.:** 0.000—0.321

#### 1Password

- Good thresholds:

**Abs.:** 0.276—0.807 **Quant.:** 0.276—0.813

Cookie: 21 vs. Cookie: "Weak"

```
def quantize(strength):
    if strength >= 90:
        return "Fantastic"
    if strength >= 60:
        return "Excellent"
    if strength >= 35:
        return "Good"
    if strength >= 20:
        return "Weak"
    return "Terrible"
```

#### **Future Directions & Limitations**

#### **Next steps:**

- Dependency on pw distribution

ID: 7B RNN Generic (Web) (0.421—0.777)

ID: 7C RNN Target (0.860—0.965)

- Model size
- Understand and mitigate the negative effects of quantization
- Work on the deployability, too! (zxcvbn's success)

#### Limitation

Usability and deployability aspects are vital for a complete assessment but are not presented in this work!

# password-meter-comparison.org

