

# "We may share the number of diaper changes": A Privacy and Security Analysis of Mobile Child Care Applications

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## Childcare Apps







### Childcare Apps

- We analyzed 42 child care Android apps
  - Apps identified through search queries
    "Childcare app"
    "Preschool management apps"
- Over 3 million users of the analyzed apps

Арр	Category	Installs
1Core Family	Production	1,000+
Bloomz	Education	1,000,000+
brightwheel	Education	1,000,000+
CARE Kita App	Parenting	10,000+
Cheqdin	Education	1,000+
Child Journal	Education	5,000+
Daily Connect	Education	50,000+
Educa Touch	Education	50,000+
Famly	Social	100,000+
HiMama	Education	100,000+
Hokita-Eltern	Communication	500+

### Children's Privacy

- Analyzed apps process sensitive data
  - □ PII (i.e., name, dob, address)
  - **Behaviour (i.e., notes on development and activities)**
  - Photos and videos
  - Current location
  - Health data
- COPPA and GDPR regulate the collection and processing of children's data

#### Analysis Framework



## Privacy Policy Analysis

- We performed a manual analysis
  - Available tools fall short for multi language policies (~30% of all apps)
- Privacy policy analyzed from Google PlayStore link
- Privacy policy mentions
  - Processing of child data
  - □ Tracking
  - **Data storing/sharing**
  - Access to own data



# 11 (26%) of the policies refer to the website or the company

# 14 (33%) do not list the data stored and processed by the app

# Only 29 (69%) policies mention the processing of minor's data

### Privacy Results

Арр	Processing of Children Data	Tracking Mentioned	Data Sharing	Data Retention
Hokita	X	×	no	no
KigaRoo	X		listed	listed
Parentzone	X	×	unspecified	yes without list
Daily Connect			listed	listed
Sandbox Parent App	X	· · X · ·	listed	listed
Stramplerbande	X	X	unspecified	unspecified
LiveKid			listed	listed
Kaymbu			listed	no
HiMama			listed	no
Educa Touch			listed	no

### **Client Security Related Findings**

- 95% of the apps did not use certificate pinning
- 98% of the apps still support outdated Android versions
- 30% of the used libraries are compiled in an insecure way
  - □ Missing Relocation-Flag (RELRO)
  - Missing Non-Executable Stack Flag (NX)
  - Missing Stack-Canary

### Backend Security Related Findings

- 70% of backends use outdated software with known vulnerabilities (CVE)
- 10% of backends are vulnerable to critical vulnerabilities
  - □ SQL injection
  - **GraphQL** injection
  - Insecure Direct Object Referencing
- 12% of backends use insecure cloud storages
  - Photos and videos of children
  - □ Chat messages
  - **User information**

#### Takeaway and Recommendation



Most analyzed apps use some sort of vulnerable software and unclear privacy policies Developers of child care applications need to be trained and made aware of their responsibilities





We need accessible guidelines and checklists that can be used by daycare facilities Not using child care apps may ultimately lead to the use of unhealthy alternatives (i.e., WhatsApp)







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There is a demand for instant communication



We need guidelines and checklists



Developers need to be trained and made aware

